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Abstract 
In the wake of the widespread uptake of and debate surrounding the work of Karen Barad, this 
article revisits her core conceptual contributions. We offer descriptions, elaborations, 
problematizations and provocations for those intrigued by or invested in this body of work. We 
examine Barad’s use of quantum physics, which underpins her conception of the material world. 
We discuss the political strengths of this position but also note tensions associated with applying 
quantum physics to phenomena at macro-scales. We identify both frictions and unacknowledged 
affinities with science and technology studies in Barad’s critique of reflexivity and her concept of 
diffraction. We flesh out Barad’s overarching position of ‘agential realism’, which contains a 
revised understanding of scientific apparatuses. Building upon these discussions, we argue that 
inherent in agential realism is both an ethics of inclusion and an ethics of exclusion. Existing 
research has, however, frequently emphasized entanglement and inclusion to the detriment of 
foreclosure and exclusion. Nonetheless, we contend that it is in the potential for an ethics of 
exclusion that Barad’s work could be of greatest utility within science and technology studies and 
beyond.  
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Introduction 
In Artful, her collection of  critical essays, Smith (2013: 41) reminds us of  a childhood game 
designed to break the boredom of  long car journeys – ‘Ten points to the person who can see the 
Forth Road bridge’ – and points to its direct suitability to the situation of  the academic 
conference: ‘Ten points to the first person who hears someone say the words Walter Benjamin.’ 
In recent years, it has been possible to play a version of  this game substituting ‘Karen Barad’ for 
‘Walter Benjamin’. If  we add in bonus points for a cluster of  terms taken from her book Meeting 
the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of  Matter and Meaning (2007) – especially 
‘entanglement’, ‘diffraction’, ‘intra-action’ and ‘agential realism’ – then a fine game of  ‘Barad 
Bingo’ can be had far and wide across the humanities and social sciences: from conferences on 
ruins, animal ethics and informational infrastructures to journal articles on lifelong learning 
(Edwards, 2010), bullying in schools (Søndergaarda, 2012) and feminist theories of  fashion 
(Parkins, 2008). 
It is striking that a book dealing with quantum mechanics, double-slit experiments, wave-particle 
duality, and Bohrian notions of  complementarity has been engaged with so readily across fields 
such as cultural theory (Haraway, 2008), economics (Carlile et al., 2013), media (Parikka, 2011), 
social movement studies (Feigenbaum, 2014), theoretical psychology (Shotter, 2014), and even 
Hegelian philosophy (Žižek, 2012). It is perhaps equally striking that this work has received a 
more ambivalent response from what Barad calls ‘mainstream’ (Barad, 2007: 36) and Haraway 
calls ‘canonized’ (Haraway, 2004: 339) science and technology studies (Lynch, 2014; Pinch, 2011; 
Woolgar and Lezaun, 2013), a discipline that might be imagined to be particularly receptive to a 
book concerned with such topics.  
We proceed with caution when drawing upon this distinction between mainstream/canonical and 
feminist science and technology studies (STS), given that the distinction threatens to marginalize 
feminist scholarship. In an extensive discussion of  the topic, Haraway (2004: 338-341), describes 
feminist technoscience as ‘both inside and outside’ (p. 340) ‘canonical’ STS. The relationship is 
described as problematic, not least when researchers like Harding and Fox Keller are written out 
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of  the discipline’s genealogy. Accordingly, we urge a consideration of  the ethics associated with 
‘cutting’ away (in Baradian vocabulary) feminist technoscience from another portion of  the 
discipline. Nonetheless, Haraway does note differences (including the political visions of  feminist 
technoscience – p. 341) and, as noted in the body of  our text, Barad discusses meaningful 
distinctions between ‘mainstream’ and ‘feminist’ STS at various points (e.g Barad, 2007: 29, 36, 
56-57, 87). 
In this article, we examine Barad’s work and her framework of  ‘agential realism’ in order to 
interrogate some apparent theoretical resonances and tensions with the rest of  STS. We flesh out 
the implications of  Barad’s work for STS, explore its broader implications, highlight key 
problems, and offer theoretical, methodological and particularly ethical provocations for future 
work. 
 
Both theory and physics 
Barad currently holds the title of Professor of Feminist Studies, Philosophy, and History of 
Consciousness at the University of California at Santa Cruz. Barad’s background is, however, in 
physics, completing a PhD within the field (Barad, 1984a) and publishing several, related, articles 
in the discipline (Barad, 1984b, 1988; Barad et al., 1984). Yet, as is evident from the above 
discussion it is since changing disciplines that Barad’s work has taken off, and she is now 
described as ‘one of the most influential and important representatives of contemporary 
materialist scholarship’ (Lemke, 2015: 5).  
Interestingly, Barad’s significance arises from a comparatively small output. Two articles 
published in the 1990s have received several hundred citations (Barad, 1996, 1998) but it is an 
article of 2003 (Barad, 2003; 3000 citations) and the aforementioned book, Meeting the Universe 
Halfway (Barad, 2007; 4400 citations) that have really captured the imagination. In the words of 
reviewer Hird (2009: 338): ‘to say that this book crosses disciplines is an understatement’. What 
is more, and as evidenced below (Figure 1), the influence of Barad’s work continues to grow, 
with the above outputs receiving significant year-on-year increases in citation counts. And this 
brings us to an important point: While Barad’s project spans twenty years, it is evidently of this 
moment.  
Certainly, Barad’s work offers elaborations and nuances to hybridity studies, mobility studies, 
actor-network theory and a host of other projects being undertaken within the social sciences 
4 
 
and humanities. Importantly, however, Barad seeks influence beyond social theory, stating that 
her  
project departs from mainstream and feminist science studies in that it does not merely 
offer insights about the nature of scientific practices but also makes a constructive 
contribution to the field of science being studied. (Barad, 2007: 36) 
Barad’s work, then, aspires toward a substantial contribution to the natural sciences and, 
undeniably, it is also remarkably of its time in this domain. First, Barad has been used by social 
scientists to understand contemporary scientific concepts such as the Anthropocene (e.g. 
Haraway, 2015: 159), epigenetics (e.g. Papadopoulos, 2011: 434), and neuroplasticity (e.g. 
Schmitz and Höppner, 2014: 5) wherein nature and culture are self-evidently collapse into one 
another. Second, Barad’s project has supported forms of inter- or trans-disciplinary work (e.g. 
Fitzgerald and Callard, 2014; Science and Justice Research Centre, 2013) that tally with recent 
‘legislative calls for the integration of social sciences and humanities in publicly funded research 
and development initiatives’ (Viseu, 2015: 643). Yet while this emphasis on entanglement (of 
both matter and disciplines) is precisely what lends Barad’s work purchase within a broad 
interdisciplinary arena, it may also account for a certain ambivalence within strands of STS that 
have emphasized critical distance and reflexivity. 
 
Figure 1: Citations counts for Barad’s key works. Information from Google Scholar and 
accurate as of 21st June, 2017 
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Approaching Barad 
In response to the widespread interest – positive and otherwise – in Barad’s work, and at the ten-
year anniversary of Meeting the Universe’s initial publication, here we return to the source material 
in order to offer an exploration and assessment of Barad’s work, clarifying its significance and 
implications. To do this, we engage with some of the diverse contexts in which Barad’s work has 
resonance, teasing out the ethical, methodological and conceptual significance of her work in 
relation to some of the core concerns of STS, whilst foregrounding her interdisciplinary 
significance along the way. 
As described above, Barad suggests that she is not only ‘doing STS’ but also ‘doing science’. We 
begin, therefore, by delineating the role of quantum physics in Barad’s work. We highlight that 
physics is not a metaphorical resource for Barad but, rather, underpins agential realism’s 
articulation of how the material world is brought into being. This realist, materialist basis offers 
agential realism a stability that is argued to be of political utility in avoiding dangers associated 
with both social constructivism and relativism. Questions are raised, however, about the 
applicability of concepts originating in the quantum realm and what is lost when they ‘jump 
scales’ and are used in order to grasp macro-sociological concerns.  
The implications of Barad’s relationship with science is then discussed in the context of STS, 
with a focus on tensions that have emerged in relation to Barad’s critique of reflexivity in favour 
of diffraction. While diffraction productively lends itself to an interdisciplinary agenda, we 
suggest that Barad’s reading of reflexivity does not do justice to the heterogeneous 
understandings of the concept within STS and that there is an unacknowledged possibility of 
rapprochement.  
In the next section, we introduce Barad’s theory of agential realism. Agential realism contends 
that wide-ranging apparatuses do not measure but, rather, produce material realities. 
Furthermore, Barad argues that the instantiation of one reality necessarily excludes another, 
equally feasible, possibility. These ‘agential cuts’ are exclusions that arise when a particular reality 
is brought into being. There is, thus, both an ethics of inclusion and an ethics of exclusion 
inherent in Barad’s work. We conclude the article by arguing that in much of the literature 
drawing upon Barad there is a focus upon diffraction and entanglement and that this has come at 
the expense of considerations of complementarity and necessary exclusion. We suggest, 
however, that it is the radical potential of an ethics of exclusion which is perhaps most vital to 
those continuing to use Barad’s work. 
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We are not putting forward a singular way in which in which Barad ‘should’ be read. Instead of a 
definitive reading we have three aims, the first of which is to simply provide a ‘way in’, to 
describe Barad’s key concepts. Our second aim is to elaborate, to detail some of the existing, 
interdisciplinary, literature that furthers, problematizes or speaks to Barad, to place it within a 
broader context. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in undertaking the above, we are also 
offering a series of provocations, suggesting possible alliances and directions for future study. 
Making matter matter, or, in search of lost realness 
Rather than speculate as to what might be fuelling the surge of  interest in Barad, it might be 
better to begin by pressing hard upon the physics of  Meeting the Universe Halfway and, in 
particular, the role of  physics within Barad’s more general social theory. It is important to ask 
whether the guarantees that seem to be offered by a quantum take on the relationship between 
matter and meaning are as secure as they might appear. Does the process by which ‘matter 
comes to matter’ in Barad's thesis matter? When we call upon Barad to help secure an argument, 
how can we be sure that we are not suffering from a new case of  physics envy – of  the quantum 
variety? 
Psychologists, ecologists, economists, geographers, geologists, geneticists and political and social 
scientists, have all, at one time or another, been accused of  suffering from ‘physics envy’ (Clarke 
and Primo, 2012; Egler, 1986; Massey, 1999, 2005). Depending upon the company they keep, 
researchers can be seen to be more or less hard in their relation to the hard sciences (Massey, 
1999). Physics – with its abstractions and detachments – is said to be ‘ontologically hard’ as well 
as methodologically, epistemologically and emotionally challenging (Traweek, 2009: 74-105), 
contributing to the received idea that physics simply is hard (McAlpine, 2012). 
The ‘hardness’ of  physics assumes a distinct form in Barad’s work. Avoiding naïve positivism, 
Barad argues that her engagement with quantum theory offers the humanities and social sciences 
a way of  undoing ‘the pairing of  constructivism with some form of  antirealism’ (Barad, 2007: 
43) and a potential resolution to the essentialism/social constructivism, 
postivism/postmodernism debates of  the 1990s where ‘language has been granted too much 
power’ (Barad, 2007: 132). In what follows we detail Barad’s specific conception of  matter and 
how it has offered a means of  plotting a path through these longstanding debates. We also, 
however, suggest that further attention needs to be paid to the politics of  scale, and whether 
insights from quantum mechanics should be smoothly related to phenomena that occur at the 
macro-scales that are more often of  concern to social and cultural theorists.  
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A philosophy-physics 
The hardness that is offered by Barad's thesis is comprised of  different properties than that 
which attracted, for instance, neoclassical economists (Mirowski, 1992, 2008) or the positivists 
and behaviourists that Foucault warns against in The Order of  Things (2001[1970]). A mildly 
apologetic realist, Barad ‘own[s] up’ and ‘confess[es]’ her commitment to a rehabilitated 
objectivity: an objectivity resting, oddly, upon principles of  uncertainty, paradox and ‘quantum 
weirdness’ (Barad, 2007: 83).  
This rehabilitated objectivity draws significant inspiration from Niels Bohr’s ‘philosophy-physics’, 
which utterly rejects Newtonian mechanics, with its positivist certainties, discrete objects and 
measurable forces. Instead, Bohr’s thought pursues its case via principles of  uncertainty and 
indeterminacy. Here, the classical version of  physics gives way to an entangled universe governed 
by subatomic particles and, moreover, where measuring instruments become inextricably 
snagged in the scenes of  their experiments, softening and fraying science at the edges. The 
sensorium of  the laboratory – the feeling of  doing science – serves to blur the boundaries still 
further as Barad insists upon the presence of  the scientist as a productive force in her 
experiments. 
We pursue these topics at greater length in subsequent sections. For the moment, however, the 
most important point is that, despite all this blurring and indeterminacy, quantum measurements 
are still objective insofar as they are reproducible and communicable with ‘permanent marks ... left 
on bodies which define the experimental conditions’ (Barad, 2007: 119). The predictable 
outcome of  quantum experiments – for Bohr, their reproducibility and communicability – adds a 
strange stability to the world. For those frustrated by the rhetorical spinning associated with 
deconstruction and, with this, the social constructivist overestimation of  discourse (a markedly 
feminist concern see Zalewski, 2003), Barad’s ‘ontoepistemological’ account of  nature sets out to 
show that ‘direct engagement with the ontology of  our world is possible’ (Barad, 2007: 44), all 
without reinforcing a naïve positivism. 
By way of  comparison, Kellert (2005, 2008) has discussed the use of  chaos theory within the 
social and human sciences. He explores chaos theory as a form of  ‘borrowed knowledge’ within 
social science and suggests that physics here serves a ‘rhetorical function’, used to establish 
prestige, additional understanding, or methodological innovation and which may be both fruitful 
and dangerous (Kellert, 2005: 240). This is resolutely not what Barad intends in Meeting the 
Universe Halfway. Barad’s agential realism is strongly premised upon the continuity – or 
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entanglement – between the results of  quantum theory and the macro-realms with which social 
scientists are generally concerned. Quantum physics is not a metaphor, but is instead an instance 
of  matter with which Barad is working.  
Barad (2007: 279) asserts that the same rules apply in the microscopic and macroscopic domains 
and that conclusions reached from studying experimental physics apply to a legion of  other 
domains. Both Pinch (2011) and Morton (2012) have questioned this approach, throwing down 
the gauntlet when it comes to the quantum entanglement experiments that lend empirical 
support to agential realism and asking the question: To what extent does this thesis, together 
with its attendant conceptual apparatuses, rest upon its physics? Again, Barad, in her reply to 
Pinch, is unequivocal:  
I propose an agential realist interpretation of  quantum physics …. This agential realist 
interpretation is vulnerable to empirical results, as it should be. It has to cohere with what 
we know. And, likewise, yes, scandalous as it may be to some, agential realism could 
ultimately be proven wrong …. (Barad, 2011: 446) 
There are two entirely concordant consequences to this continuity between physics and social 
theory. First, Barad’s realism promises to firm up the ‘beneath’, to put it in Foucauldian terms, of  
knowledge (Lather, 2010) by offering ‘the weight of  realism’ as ‘ballast’ against too much 
postmodernism (Barad, 2007: 43). Barad’s thesis, thus, can be pressed into service as support for 
an array of  political projects, ranging from the practice of  cultural geography (Whatmore, 2002) 
to a socially sensitive science (Harding, 2004) to the proposition of  new (Dolphijn and Van der 
Tuin, 2012) and materialist feminisms (Alaimo, 2008): ‘Material feminists want to know how we 
can define the “real” in science and how we can describe nonhuman agency in a scientific 
context’ (Alaimo, 2008: 7). Baradian onto-epistemology, with its notions of  agential realism and 
intra-action, works hard, then, to establish a lively and worldly substratum, which, despite its 
mysterious nature, is testable and trustworthy. Objects, entities and phenomena are demonstrably 
instantiated in and by material practices, produced performatively in concrete situations and thus 
– crucially – can anchor political actions. This approach carries distinct ethical implications, on 
which we focus shortly. 
The second issue concerns whether we can assume that rules that govern the quantum sphere 
also govern macro-scales. That macroscopic objects (like Schrodinger’s cat) don’t appear to 
follow quantum rules is of  course widely known, discussed, and a variety of  diverse explanations 
have been offered over the decades (e.g. Jammer, 1974). Again, Barad discusses these topics at 
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length, drawing upon Bohr and arguing that the micro- and macro- worlds are entangled with 
one another, that there is no clean break between the two, and that the same rules apply in both 
domains (Barad, 2007: 279). It is not for us to decide if  Barad’s particular take on this issue is 
more or less robust than Everett’s many worlds hypothesis, or Bohm’s hidden-variables 
interpretation (discussed in Pinch, 2011), or any one of  the other interpretations offered and 
discussed within the physics community (Barad, 2007: 287). It does, however, mean that the issue 
of  scale is particularly pertinent for those seeking to draw upon Barad’s work, and worth dwelling 
on. 
Jumping scales 
In a discussion on the topic, Barad strongly resists ‘geometric readings of the notion of scale’ 
(Barad, 2007: 245) wherein the micro- or quantum-scale can always be assumed to be 
unproblematically ‘smaller’ than the macro-realm, the local always be assumed to be 
unproblematically smaller than the global, and so forth. Scale is, instead, an outcome of on-going 
worldly processes of production, contestation, and reproduction (Barad, 2007: 245). In making 
this point, Barad draws heavily upon the work of  geographer Neil Smith, which is a pertinent 
touchstone here for at least two reasons: First, Smith’s work is attuned to debates within the 
history of  physics (e.g. Smith, 2008: 94-107). Second, and more important, Smith questions the 
givenness of  scale, arguing instead that ‘the construction of  scale is a social process, i.e., scale is 
produced in and through societal activity which in turn produces and is produced by 
geographical structures of  social interaction’ (Smith, 1992: 62). This second point in particular is 
very obviously in keeping with Barad’s work.  
For Barad and Smith to argue that scale is produced is not for them to assert that diverse scales 
are not real. Rather, the argument is that ‘nested’ scales (Smith, 1992: 66) emerge as exteriorities-
within-phenomena. Attention is thus shifted away from ‘[q]uestions of size and shape 
(geometrical concerns),’ and is instead reoriented to ‘questions of boundary, connectivity, 
interiority, and exteriority (topological concerns)’ (Barad, 2007: 244). 
There is an additional important point here. For Smith, the ‘deliberate confusion and abrogation’ 
of  diverse scales, the deliberate ‘jumping’ of  scales is an activity with profound radical, political 
potential (Smith, 1992: 66). Barad explicitly endorses this proposal to jump scales (Barad, 2007: 
245) and ‘jumps’ repeatedly in Meeting the Universe Halfway, taking agential realism and Bohr’s 
philosophy-physics from the quantum realm to pregnant bodies (pp. 215-222), factories (pp. 
226-230, undersea creatures (pp. 377-380), and any other number of spaces. Furthermore, and 
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just as importantly, Barad’s project self-evidently lends itself to the jumping of scales. Agential 
realism is deployed across a range of scales, in an array of different spaces, and it has jumped 
these scales rather smoothly. 
The capacity to ‘jump scales’ is problematized not only by those physicists who question the 
relationship between micro- and macro-scopic realms but also by Tsing, with whom Barad also 
shares a great deal. In her recent book The Mushroom at the End of the World (2015), Tsing argues 
that ‘[t]he ability to make one’s research framework apply to greater scales, without changing the 
research questions, has become a hallmark of modern knowledge’ (p. 38). Tsing is careful not to 
refer to scalable projects as ‘bad’ and non-scalable projects as ‘good’, but the reference to a 
‘plantation’ mentality among those who ‘change scales smoothly without any change in project 
frames’ has obvious negative connotations. Instead, Tsing draws attention to ‘scales [that] do not 
nest neatly’ (p. 37), the frictions experienced when moving between scales, and encourages pause 
over what is lost in the transition between scales; those specific qualities which are valuable 
precisely because they are not scalable. 
We introduce Tsing here not to demonstrate that those who take up agential realism are ‘wrong’ 
to apply philosophy-physics so widely; besides being a purposive political strategy it also worth 
noting that a capacity to jump scales is probably a necessary quality of any theory which has 
gained the purchase that Barad’s work has. We do, however, seek to dwell upon the frictions 
experienced when jumping scale and urge a consideration of what is lost during the jump. In 
following sections, we will argue that, in the widespread uptake of Barad’s work, political and 
ethical potential is one such lost quality and that these themes need to be revisited in order for 
the more profound implications of her approach to be developed. In the following section, we 
will begin to lay the groundwork for this focus on ethics by examining the knowledge-politics of 
agential realism more closely focusing upon one transition where considerable friction has been 
evident: the use of agential realism within STS. 
Reflection and diffraction  
Concerns about new materialist appeals to an ontology grounded in physics have been brought 
to the fore in debates surrounding Barad’s work within STS. Interestingly, and despite aligning 
with STS (Barad, 2007: 58), Barad’s uptake within this community has been patchy and, outside 
of the feminist technoscience perspective to which Barad is most obviously connected, 
responses from leading figures within ‘mainstream’ (see above) STS have been, fairly 
consistently, disparaging (e.g. Lynch, 2014; Pinch, 2011). Why might this be the case?  
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 Barad disavows the separation and reflection which she sees as typical in STS and states instead 
that ‘the crucial point is not mirroring but its creative undoing, not sameness reproduced without 
end but attentiveness to differences that matter’ (Barad, 2007: 382). As others have suggested 
(Pinch, 2011: 439-440; also Fitzgerald, 2012: 107-110), Barad’s stance on this matter is surely one 
of the core reasons why she has found ambivalent response from much of the STS community. 
In this section, we explore Barad’s critique of reflexivity and her alternative, diffraction. Despite 
the obvious utility of diffraction, the section concludes with some thoughts on the possible 
merits of rescuing reflection.  
Barad’s critique of reflexivity 
Barad’s critique of reflexivity is well captured in the following quote: 
Reflexivity, like reflection, still holds the world at a distance. It cannot provide a way 
across the social constructivist’s allegedly unbridgeable epistemological gap between 
knower and known, for reflexivity is nothing more than iterative mimesis: even in its 
attempts to put the investigative subject back in the picture, reflexivity does nothing 
more than mirror mirroring. Representation raised to the nth power does not disrupt the 
geometry that holds object and subject at a distance as the very condition for 
knowledge’s possibility. Mirrors upon mirrors, reflexivity entails the same old geometrical 
optics of reflections. (Barad, 2007: 87-88) 
The key points for Barad, then, are that reflexivity emphasises sameness and separateness. Perhaps, 
we might argue, this is an unfair representation of constructivist views (Lynch, 2014: 142) or that 
reflexivity retains methodological utility in encouraging us to dwell upon the influence of our 
own activity? Barad rejects this methodological suggestion with a wonderful line: ‘Turning the 
mirror around, as it were, is a bad method for trying to get the mirror in the picture’ (Barad, 
2007: 418). 
Diffraction as an alternative 
So Barad is unimpressed with reflexivity. In its place, she, via Haraway, suggests diffraction as both 
a methodology and a way of viewing the world. In order to understand Barad’s use of diffraction 
it is helpful to return to the physical basis of the phenomena from which she draws conceptual 
inspiration. When two particles encounter each other they are not able to occupy the same space; 
they retain their own distinct properties and bounce off in different directions, as in a game of 
snooker. Waves, however, are quite different. When two waves encounter one another they are 
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able to occupy the same point in space and time – this is called superposition – and the new 
emergent wave has properties that result from the combination of the two (Barad, 2007: 76). 
Barad uses the example of two stones being dropped into a calm pool of water to illustrate this 
point; the waves spread out, ultimately overlap, and form new patterns. This is the process that 
gives rise to Barad’s terminology: The coming together of two waves is called diffraction, the 
resulting pattern of new waves is called a diffraction pattern, and the thing which makes the two 
waves come together in the first place (the dropping stones) is called the diffraction apparatus. 
Importantly, by studying the diffraction pattern it is possible to learn about the nature of the 
diffraction apparatus so, for example, we can learn something about the dropping of the stones 
by examining the ripples in the pool (Barad, 2007: 83). As noted above, studying the effects of a 
mirror is much harder and, thus, focusing on diffraction is seen as a much more useful way of 
bringing the method, the apparatus, in to focus. 
So whereas reflection focuses upon sameness and separateness, diffraction is about ‘reading 
insights through one another in attending to and responding to the details and specificities of 
relations of difference and how they matter’ (Barad, 2007: 71). This focus on coming together, 
entanglement and emergent difference stands not only for physics but also for analyses in STS, 
cultural studies and a range of other disciplines. The founding error of STS for Barad, then, is 
evident in title of Bloor’s book; he should be concerned not with a Sociology of Scientific 
Knowledge but rather a Sociology through Scientific Knowledge and he should be aware that, 
following this disciplinary diffraction, the emergent object of investigation will look like neither 
sociology nor science but will be quite different with its own, unique, properties.  
There is much to admire about Barad’s vocabulary. It is well suited, deliberately so (Barad, 2011: 
444), to a transdisciplinary research agenda and it is no surprise that Barad has been taken up 
favourably by those striving for such collaboration (e.g. Fitzgerald and Callard, 2014).  
 
Reflecting on reflexivity 
Perhaps ironically, Barad does not seem be to attentive to difference where reflexivity is 
concerned; both Ashmore (1989) and Lynch (2000) have conducted extensive analyses of 
reflexivity and identified numerous categories, each with sub-categories that often have very little 
in common with one another (Lynch, 2000: 27). Furthermore, not all of these categories are 
based upon optical metaphors or mirroring. Slavoj Žižek makes this point while discussing 
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Hegelian notions of reflexivity in relation to Barad's work (2013: 931), but similar arguments 
have also been made within STS. Ashmore (1989: 31), for example, notes that optics is just one 
element of a diverse and complex etymological background where reflexivity is concerned. 
Indeed, Ashmore notes the concept of ‘essential reflexivity’ within ethnomethodology refers to 
‘the mutually constitutive nature of accounts and reality’ (p. 32). This is the form of reflexivity 
taken forward by Woolgar (1986) and others (e.g. Lynch, 2000) under the moniker ‘constitutive 
reflexivity’. According to Woolgar, constitutive reflexivity:  
‘…offers us a way of seeing these distinctions [between ‘a thing and what is said about a 
thing’] as actively created achievements rather than as pre-given features of our world. In 
particular, the distinction between talk and the objects-of-talk is seen from the 
constitutive perspective as the upshot, rather than the condition, of discursive work.’ 
(Woolgar, 1986: 314) 
Woolgar’s account shares a great deal with Barad’s. It encourages us to believe that any 
discussion of ‘the methodology of reflexivity’ (Barad, 2007: 72, our emphasis) is misguided, but 
also that there exists significant possibility for rapprochement between many reflexive and 
diffractive accounts in STS.   
A second issue concerns what we learn from Barad about physics. It is beyond dispute that a 
great deal has been learnt about physics by ‘playing the stranger’ as Shapin and Schaffer (1985: 6, 
our emphasis) have it. It is also true that existing studies of the physics community (see, for 
example, the classic studies by Collins [1975], Knorr Cetina [1999], and Pinch [1981]) are far 
more sceptical about the ‘reproducibility and unambiguous communication of laboratory results’ 
(Barad, 2007: 340) upon which an objective philosophy-physics (e.g. p. 174) is founded.  
In a recent article, Paxson and Helmreich (2013: 169) argued that: 
‘[New materialism] is productive because it can shake thinking away from the certainties 
of social determinism, as exampled, canonically, in the Strong Programme in the 
Sociology of Knowledge – and because it can show that phenomena emerge in practice. 
But it is also risky, because new materialist tactics often veer towards universalizing 
metaphysical claims about the nature of ‘matter’ as such and also, at times, take scientific 
truth claims about the world at face value – a move that we consider a step backwards 
for STS.’ 
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There are instances where these ‘promises and perils’ are played out in Meeting the Universe Halfway 
for alongside its distinctive contribution it is easy to argue that the text is less critical about 
contemporary physics, nanoscience, and genetic modification than we expect from STS. The 
reading of synthetic biotechnology (p. 365-367), for example, arguably trades in the ‘speculative 
scenarios’ (Jefferson et al., 2014) and myths of biotechnical revolution (Nightingale and Martin, 
2004) that research informed by STS has long queried. Nonetheless, the aforementioned 
affinities with constitutive reflexivity suggest no fundamental incompatibility between diffractive 
approaches and much of the research in STS that preceded them. Rather, and as Paxson and 
Helmreich argue, the on-going challenge is to produce analyses able to incorporate insights from 
both reflexive and diffractive approaches, including agential realism. One potential area of  
investigation in this regard is the nature of  scientific apparatuses, given that determining what is 
included in the apparatus is a significant question for various strands of  STS. 
Agential realism and the nature of the apparatus 
In the previous sections, we made the following arguments: First, Barad is a self-consciously 
realist scholar who attests that matter really does matter. Second, Barad is dismissive of 
reflexivity and, more generally, of any research endeavour – including much of STS – suggestive 
of an ‘optics of reflection’ (Barad, 2007: 135) preferring instead to rely upon notions of 
‘diffraction’. While highlighting the very obvious strengths of these positions, we have not 
treated these assertions unproblematically and have questioned these claims on several grounds. 
In this section, we show how these two themes come together in the notion of ‘agential realism’ 
and demonstrate that at the heart of this concept is a reworking of what constitutes a scientific 
apparatus. This reworking is an important move in going beyond a critique of reflection, in order 
to craft alternative approaches to knowledge politics and, by extension, ethics.  
Barad strongly resists any metaphysics that insists that things-in-themselves stand separate from 
representations of those things. For Barad, both naïve scientific realism and social constructivism 
are equally guilty ‘concordant epistemologies’ (p. 135) in this regard. For naïve realists, tools of 
measurement are entirely separate from the thing being measured. So, for example, a ruler does 
not affect that nature of the item being measured and is instead a neutral conveyer of 
information. Social constructivists, meanwhile, give language a primacy and distance from the 
world to the extent that matter is inaccessible and inquiry is limited to discourse. These 
differences may be profound enough to have ushered in the science wars but, for Barad, there is 
a deep unity; a dependence upon representation. In many ways this approach echoes Haraway’s 
earlier criticisms of a Kantian metaphysics that ‘set[s] off at extreme poles Things-in-Themselves 
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from the Transcendental Ego … with escalating and dire consequences for the repertoire of 
explanatory possibilities’ (1992: 329). And, as with Haraway, the shift from reflection to 
diffraction, highlighted in the previous section, provides a way out of representation. Within 
diffractive approaches there is no pre-given distinction between worlds and words. Instead 
measuring devices, words, and things are thoroughly entangled and co-constitute one another; the 
way Barad figures this entanglement, however, offers distinct conceptual trajectories.  
From uncertainty to indeterminancy 
In elucidating the co-constitutive nature of matter and discourse, Barad once again draws heavily 
upon the ‘philosophy-physics’ of Niels Bohr and, in particular, his solution to Werner 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. The uncertainty principle states that it is impossible to 
measure all the properties of a given particle accurately – most famously it is possible to measure 
a particle’s momentum or its position, but not both. This problem is frequently read as an 
epistemic problem – the act of measuring trait a (e.g. position) disturbs the particle to the extent 
that it is impossible to measure trait b (e.g. momentum) accurately. This is precisely the form of 
representationalist position that Barad disputes, for it suggests there are things-in-the-world 
(particles with position and momentum) that pre-exist attempts to measure or represent them.  
The alternative offered by Barad closely follows that provided by Bohr. Bohr argued that the 
uncertainty principle is not one of epistemic uncertainty but, rather, of ontic indeterminacy. Prior 
to the measurement attempts, Bohr and Barad suggest, the particle simply did not exist in any 
fixed state. In other words,  
there aren’t little things wandering aimlessly in the void that possess the complete set of 
properties that Newtonian physics assumes (e.g., position and momentum); rather, there 
is something fundamental about the nature of measurement interactions that, given a 
particular measuring apparatus, certain properties become determinate, while others are 
specifically excluded. (Barad, 2007: 19, italics in original) 
For Bohr and Barad, therefore, it is following specific intra-actions, such as attempts at 
measurement, that objects like particles take on the properties they do. Particles do not pre-exist 
interactions but instead emerge from them, taking on particular properties (like position) while 
others properties (like momentum) are excluded. Position and momentum, in other words, are 
complementary states. This principle of complementarity ensures that the existence of one 
property necessarily excludes the other.  
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Relata do not preexist relations; rather, relata-within-phenomena emerge through specific 
intra-actions. Crucially, then, intra-actions enact agential separability – the condition of 
exteriority-within-phenomena. (Barad, 2007: 140, italics in original). 
The key terms within this passage – intra-action, agential separability, exteriority-within – all 
indicate that for Barad the separations between words, things, and knowers are real enough but 
these separations are effects of particular engagements with the world (p. 138). This is the crux of 
Barad’s agential realism. 
Agential realism thus insists that key elements involved in experimentation – the particle, the 
measuring apparatus, the conceptual frameworks and the scientist recording the measurements 
(p. 138) – all emerge from the experimental entanglement and do not pre-exist them. This 
performativity does not lead to anarchy, however, for, as noted above, the same particular 
diffraction apparatus will always produce the same diffraction pattern and, thus, scientific 
experiments that take a particular apparatus to the world are reproducible: same matter, same 
apparatus, same outcome.  
Agential realism and the apparatus 
As detailed thus far, Barad’s concept of agential realism largely reframes the work of Niels Bohr 
for a new audience. Barad argues that this in itself is an important activity: by reading the 
humanities, in particular Michel Foucault and Judith Butler, against Bohr, Barad seeks to show 
that these thinkers accept and uphold a nature-culture binary while under-appreciating the role of 
matter and treating agency as something that resides solely within a pre-existing, rather than 
emergent, human subject (see Lemke [2015] for a riposte and Hollin (2017) for an elucidation). 
Nonetheless, Barad also seeks to trouble and further Bohr’s work. 
Barad first extends Bohr by questioning his reading of the apparatus as ‘mere laboratory set-up’ 
(Barad, 2007: 141), those elements safely contained within the methods section of a scientific 
report. For Barad, Bohr underappreciates the range and extent of material-discursive factors that 
(re)produce and maintain apparatuses. Barad demonstrates this point with reference to a further 
example from physics known as the Stern-Gerlach experiment (p. 161). While the particulars of 
this experiment are not important in the current context, what is important is that experimental 
results were only evident because one of the experimenters smoked cheap cigars, the sulphuric 
fumes from which were required to make experimental effects visible. On the basis of this 
finding, Barad concludes that: 
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Apparatuses are not static laboratory setups but a dynamic set of open-ended practices, 
iteratively refined and reconfigured. [In the Stern-Gerlach experiment] … a cigar is 
among the significant materials that are relevant to the operation and success of the 
experiment …. Not any cigar will do. Indeed, the cigar is a ‘condensation’ – a ‘nodal 
point’, as it were – of the workings of other apparatuses, including class, nationalism, 
economics, and gender, all of which are a part of this Stern-Gerlach apparatus. (p. 167) 
There is thus, and contra Bohr, no intrinsic outside to the apparatus; it extends far beyond the 
laboratory and methods section. 
Barad’s understanding of the apparatus, then, is more expansive than in a ‘typical’ methods 
section, more-than-human in its composition, and emergent through practice. There are clear 
affinities here with actor-network theory (e.g. Latour, 1987: 162) as well as with existing research 
in other fields attending to materiality (Kirsch, 2012), more-than-representation (Lorimer, 2005) 
and the more-than-human (Whatmore, 2004). It is perhaps interesting to note in this regard, that 
in areas where it may seem obvious that Barad’s work would be utilised – such as more-than-
human geographies – her work is conspicuous by its absence or minimal presence. These fields 
have already made valuable engagements with non-representational theories and methodologies; 
in particular the work of Whatmore (1997; 2002; 2004; 2006) has been hugely influential, as has 
that undertaken by Latour and Haraway. Perhaps, we might speculate, for theorists whose bread 
and butter it is to consider the nonhuman and their relations with humans and other 
nonhumans, Barad’s considerations are neither seismic nor entirely novel. Such a response would 
be understandable given the aforementioned affinities with a range of theorists that are 
consistently underplayed within Meeting the Universe Halfway. Nonetheless, such straightforward 
dismissals miss an important emphasis in Barad’s work which moves it beyond the diagnoses of 
hybridity found, for instance, in We Have Never Been Modern (Latour, 1993) 
The ethics of the outside 
A key point in Barad’s work is that just because apparatuses have no intrinsic outside does not 
mean there is no outside. Barad discusses this point with reference to another of Bohr’s cases, 
the example of a person using a stick to navigate a dark room. When the stick is held tightly the 
stick is part of the measuring apparatus used to observe and feel the room. When the stick is 
held loosely, however, the stick is an object, touched and experienced as part of the room, an 
object of investigation that is cut away from the measuring apparatus. This is an example of an 
agential cut, a moment where exteriorities-within emerge into the world.  
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The stick cannot usefully serve as an instrument of observation if one is intent on 
observing it. The line between subject and object is not fixed, but once a cut is made (i.e., 
a particular practice is being enacted), the identification is not arbitrary but in fact 
materially specified and determined (Barad, 2007: 154-155). 
Beyond those features identified by Barad in this quote, this example makes another facet of 
agential realism apparent: Not only is cutting a boundary-making practice (p. 148), it is a process 
over which there is a degree of control. Thus, for Barad, boundaries are not only real but there is 
a degree of responsibility for their creation, the worlds that are made, and those that are excluded 
(p. 243). Barad states that there is a lesson for STS here. In a passage that resonates with 
Haraway’s (2004: 226) earlier critique of Leviathan and the Airpump, Barad states that 
[t]he point is this: one can’t simply bracket out (or ignore) certain issues without taking 
responsibility and being accountable for the constitutive effects of these exclusions. Since 
science studies needs to take account of gender and other crucial social variables …, and 
since it no doubt wants to avoid reinstalling the metaphysics of individualism or other 
representationalist remnants into its theories, its methods, and its results, turning to 
performative accounts of gender to find out what they have to offer at least seems like a 
good starting point. (Barad, 2007: 58) 
This emphasis on separability, exteriority and constitutive exclusion is a significant part of what 
makes Barad’s work distinct and important. It is also the part of Barad’s scholarship that is most 
frequently lost in the re-telling. We conclude this paper by discussing the decisive ethical 
contribution that we believe Barad is able to make, which builds on her specific conception of 
matter, commitment to diffraction and reworking of the apparatus (with its attendant 
implications for knowledge-politics).  
Crafting an ethics of exclusion 
We have argued that, while Barad does indeed foreground the entanglement of matter and 
meaning (most notably in a preference for diffraction over reflexivity) agential realism is also 
about absence. The concept of complementarity makes clear that, for Barad, when one apparatus 
instantiates a particular world another is necessarily excluded. It is in these cuts and through 
these boundary-making practices that Barad’s ethical contribution is to be found. The 
significance of Barad’s focus upon cuts and exclusions is precisely what has been most frequently 
lost as agential realism’s vocabulary has jumped scales. In this final section, we discuss this loss 
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by considering research that has engaged with Barad via the situated, relational ethics articulated 
by Haraway. Haraway is one of Barad’s most significant interlocutors and the engagement with 
Barad in and through When Species Meet (2008) offers a striking illustration of how concepts 
associated with agential realism travel.  
Following the uptake of the term ‘intra-action’ by Haraway (2008: 17, with the concept 
underpinning her account of companion species) the term has obtained widespread currency in 
perspectives influenced by feminist STS (e.g. Latimer and Miele, 2013; Puig de la Bellacasa, 
2011). Yet, as Haraway herself suggests, use of Barad’s terminology does not necessarily mean an 
ethical engagement with the ‘radical change Barad’s analysis demands’ (2015: 162, n.1). In 
response to Haraway’s provocation, in this section we draw together our previous themes. On 
the one hand, we return to Barad’s work to interrogate what the ‘radical change’ that Haraway 
evokes entails ethically; on the other hand, through the ethics of agential realism we also 
complicate some of the ways that Barad has been taken up, including by Haraway. We argue that 
the ways with which Barad’s approach has been engaged have resulted in an over-emphasis on 
questions of entanglement. In contrast, we suggest that the ‘radical potential’ of agential realism 
is in drawing attention to what is excluded from particular entanglements.  
Situating materialist ethics 
Barad’s intra-active conception of the world offers a specific understanding of relationality that 
goes beyond earlier conceptualizations of hybridity (Haraway, 1992; Latour, 1993), a term which 
suggests relations shape pre-existing entities (Lorimer, 2015: 24). Yet, aside from offering a neat 
neologism that makes its difference from interaction explicit, on a superficial level, intra-active 
conceptions of the world do not appear to be wholly novel. Approaches that have considered 
the ‘mangle of practice’ (Pickering, 2010) such as posthumanism (Castree and Nash, 2004; 
Hayles, 1999; Wolfe, 2010), actor-network theory (Latour, 2005; Mol, 2003), non-
representational theory (Anderson and Harrison, 2010), vital-materialist approaches (Bennett, 
2009), engagements with cosmopolitics (Stengers, 1997, 2010, 2011; also Hinchcliffe et al., 2003), 
or object-oriented ontology (Bogost, 2011; Harman, 2012), all stress the agency of more-than-
human entities and make clear that the human is shaped through encounters with other agencies. 
Barad’s understanding of reality as enacted rather than pre-given similarly troubles pre-defined 
ethical hierarchies such as human/animal, subject/object, and nature/culture, as a way of 
thinking about the world.  
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In a sense, then, agential realism’s specific contribution to STS could, as Woolgar and Lezaun 
note, be situated as part of a broader ‘turn to ontology in STS’ that ‘can be better understood as 
another attempt to apply its longstanding core slogan – “it could be otherwise” – this time to the 
realm of the ontological’ (Woolgar and Lezaun, 2013: 322) or as intensifying the provocative 
power of STS perspectives rather than revolutionizing them (p. 336). Barad could thus be 
situated as part of a longer lineage of work that has collapsed the ontological and epistemological 
and turned attention to the performative composition of reality (e.g. Mol, 2002; Star, 1992). Yet, 
whilst Woolgar and Lezaun’s framing is helpful in drawing attention to conceptual lineages that 
are understated in Barad’s own work, it is agential realism’s emphasis on ethics that demands the 
most sustained ‘radical change’ in approach, and make it more than another – differently 
modulated – articulation of hybridity or constitutive reflexivity. 
Barad’s emphasis is not on the possibility of multiple ontologies, but on the relative stability 
afforded to matter after it has intra-actively emerged, due to the same apparatuses producing the 
same outcome. The ethical significance of agential realism, therefore, is not just in extending the 
idea that things ‘could have been otherwise’ to the ontological realm but in conceptualizing the 
precise moments at which things congeal ‘as they are’, by understanding the processes through 
which particular material properties emerge and other realities are excluded from being. Any 
given phenomenon, for Barad, is understood as being composed of specific intra-actions, with 
discreet identities (such as ‘subject’ and object’) only emerging after an agential cut has taken 
place. As with the example of the dark room, the stick can be part of the measuring apparatus 
(or subject) exploring the room, or experienced as an object within the room, but it cannot be 
both for these are complementary states. The stick’s affordances, and the distribution of agency 
in this arrangement, are determined by whichever cut is made. A focus on agential cuts is, 
therefore, generative of particular sets of ethical responsibilities; though matter itself has stability, 
it is still necessary to be accountable for the cuts that created this stability and grapple not just 
with the ethical consequences of these cuts, but with the constitutive exclusions that underpin 
them. It is this emphasis on cuts, we argue, that holds particular ethical significance, as becomes 
apparent when reading Barad against some of the most influential work which has engaged with 
her approach.  
Embodied ethics and exclusions 
As mentioned above, much of Barad’s influence has been obtained through Haraway. This 
influence is made explicit in Haraway’s articulation of situated, relational ethics in the animal 
laboratory, a case that offers a useful example for elucidating and interrogating the ethical 
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significance of agential realism. In a series of critical moves, Haraway first decentres the human, 
by foregrounding the entanglement of humans with other actors, and then uses this foundation 
to problematize the use of humanist ethics to adjudicate what course of action should be taken. 
Entanglements between species mean that predetermined humanist frameworks such as ‘human 
good is more important’ and appeals to ‘inviolable animal rights’ are both unworkable and 
undesirable (Haraway, 2008: 87). This then lays the foundation for Haraway’s core argument 
about what should replace longstanding ethical frameworks: care generated from entangled and 
embodied encounters. Through an openness to learning from encounters (rather than 
interpreting the behaviour of nonhuman actors in line with predetermined assumptions), 
Haraway argues (following Despret, 2004) that new forms of interest can emerge and space can 
be created to understand how nonhuman needs are articulated. This recognition of multispecies 
entanglement, coupled with an insistence on the intra-active aspect of encounters, therefore, is 
key to Haraway’s realization of a cosmopolitical ethics that creates room for nonhumans to 
impose their own ‘requirements’ on humans (Stengers, 1997, 2015).  
Grounding the ethics of companion species in Barad’s language of intra-action and agential cuts, 
Haraway is able to cement her argument that mutually transformative encounters can redistribute 
agency in ethically significant ways, depending on how things are cut. Yet while Haraway’s work 
has proven influential across a range of disciplinary contexts (e.g. DeKoven and Lundblad, 2011; 
Hinchliffe, 2010) its Baradian underpinnings are seldom engaged with in a sustained way. We 
suggest, however, that considering Barad’s work on its own terms can serve to enrich, 
complicate and re-orient accounts of situated, relational ethics. 
The importance of re-orienting ethical questions away from valorizing entanglement and towards 
the ethical implications of cuts can be elucidated through drawing on a series of debates that 
have emerged in relation to ethology, specifically the act of allowing birds to imprint upon 
humans. Despret’s re-reading of the work of ethologist Konrad Lorenz, for instance, details how 
he regularly caused goslings to imprint on him in order to acquire new knowledge about goose 
behaviour. Despret argues, moreover, that these intimate entanglements between bodies were 
also generative of new forms of ethics, as Lorenz  
involves his own responsibility because he will have to fulfil the goose’s needs, to be 
a ‘good mother’ for it, to care for it, to walk like it, to talk like it, to answer its calls, to 
understand when it is scared. Lorenz and his goose, in a relation of taming, in a 
relation that changes both identities, have domesticated one another. (Despret, 2004: 
130)  
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Van Dooren (2014) offers an alternative analysis of this case, however, focusing upon the 
(sometimes violent) exclusions that are inherent to particular cuts. He foregrounds how 
imprinting: ‘produces a relationship with humans at the expense of a whole set of other ways of 
being, often severing the possibility for a bird’s relating with others of its own species, and so 
profoundly altering its chances for social and procreative relations’ (p. 103). In this analysis, 
therefore, van Dooren is able to re-orient things away from a straight-forward valorization of 
what is generated by entangled relations themselves, and towards the realities that are excluded as 
cuts emerge through these relations. In doing so, he creates space to ask about the obligations 
that are created when things are cut in a particular way at the expense of other ways of being.  
While Haraway refers to the importance of agential cuts, they are predominantly foregrounded in 
order to denaturalize discreet distinctions between humans and other entities and, thus, 
emphasize the entangled composition of reality (an argument offered further support through 
her engagement with Despret). Indeed, these thinkers’ shared emphasis upon the transformative 
capacity of bodily entanglements has been a central theme in work that has sought to re-
conceptualize ethics as something borne of situated, relational engagements both within the 
laboratory (e.g. Davies, 2013; Greenhough and Roe, 2011; Latimer and Miele, 2013) and beyond 
(Lorimer, 2015). Revisiting Barad’s work, however, offers a reminder of an equally important 
dimension of agential cuts and one that is often underplayed when her work is used to underpin 
straightforwardly hybrid or more-than-human accounts of the world. Questions of the 
obligations opened up when certain realities are excluded are pushed to the forefront of Meeting 
the Universe Halfway, and offer an important reminder that the consequences of particular cuts are 
often difficult to reverse, especially if they are instantiated through vast socio-technical networks. 
Indeed, recent work ranging from the standardization of laboratory beagles (Giraud and Hollin, 
2016) to links between laboratories and military apparatuses (Johnson, 2015), more-than-human 
battle-scapes (Forsyth, 2017), industrial agriculture (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017) and disability 
politics (Hollin, 2017) foreground the dangers associated with an ethics borne of situated 
entanglements. These studies all illustrate that certain responsibilities and manifestations of 
agency could have already been foreclosed by a succession of cuts.  
Conclusion 
In this paper we have reviewed the conceptual implications of  agential realism in the light of 
Barad’s work having gained momentum and purchase across the social sciences and humanities. 
We do not propose how Barad ‘should’ be read or used but, instead, offer descriptions, 
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elaborations, problematizations, and provocations, attempting to trace affinities and potential 
directions of future travel. In particular, we have sought to detail the following arguments. 
First, we provide an overview of some of the key elements of Barad’s work: entanglement, intra-
action, diffraction and agential realism. Several of these concepts travel with Barad from physics. 
Quantum physics, for Barad, is resolutely not a metaphor but, rather, underpins agential realism’s 
articulation of how the material world is brought into being. The material grounding in physics is 
significant because it promises a stability and reality that can be pressed into service as support 
for an array of  political projects. A corollary of  this assertion, however, is that the rules that 
govern quantum realms must also be deemed applicable in macro contexts, and socio-cultural 
contexts in particular. We question the ease with which Barad’s work has ‘jumped’ between 
diverse scales and urged that attention be paid to frictions between scales, and what may be lost 
precisely because it is not scalable. 
We articulate Barad’s concept of diffraction and discussed the attempt to circumnavigate 
persisting critiques of reflexivity in STS. Barad argues that while reflection maintains and 
emphasizes sameness and separateness, diffraction focuses on entanglement, coming together 
and emergent difference. We argue here that diffractive approaches have demonstrable utility, 
but that they are closer to work grounded in ‘constitutive reflexivity’ than is often recognized. 
There is, thus, significant scope for rapprochement between Barad’s work and that in other 
strands of STS. 
Third, we turn to the core concept of agential realism and Barad’s reworking of apparatuses in 
order to further elucidate how matter is stabilized and can be taken seriously. Barad’s apparatuses 
are not neutral measuring devices but, rather, are directly implicated in the production of the real, 
material world. While Barad stresses that apparatuses do not have an intrinsic outside – 
apparatuses include not only scientific instruments but also any number of socio-cultural factors 
– this is not to say that there is no outside. Apparatuses are boundary-making practices, cutting 
up the world in particular ways that necessarily and inevitably exclude possible alternatives. This 
focus upon exclusion and exteriority, we argue, is often lost as agential realism travels between 
sites and needs to be revisited in order for the ethical potential of Barad’s work to be realized.  
We make this argument through a reading of literatures that have approached Barad through 
Haraway’s work. We argue that there is a tendency in much of this work to ground a situated, 
relational ethics upon concepts of entanglement and intra-action without a consideration of 
issues of complementarity and necessary exclusion. Such approaches, we suggest, may 
24 
 
uncritically celebrate relationality and hybridity without a consideration of alternative worlds lost 
at the moment of emergence. Reorienting matters towards questions of exclusion, we suggest, 
may offer the sort of ‘radical change’ that could be provoked by Barad’s work, hinted at by 
Haraway.  
Despite seeing a number of potentials in agential realism, however, it is important to caution 
against uncritically extolling the value of this approach. As Willey (2016: 993) powerfully argues, 
it is dangerous to position new materialism as a radical break from feminist, postcolonial STS 
(see also Sundberg, 2014), and uncritically valorizing agential realism can lend strength to this 
trap. It is instead important to pay careful attention to lineages with longstanding work within 
STS, which are often neglected or understated in ‘disciplinary stories’ that insist on the outright 
novelty of new materialism.  
In a manner similar to that of Barad, Rose (1995: 779) attempts to break with ‘the phallocentric 
mirror’ of critical-theoretical practice in an effort to expose the fragilities of power and to 
theorize other spaces of self/knowledge that shatter ‘the singular reflection of the same’. Yet she 
continues to work with the shards of that mirror to produce partial, plural and attentive research. 
Perhaps this provides a means for how Barad’s work can be more effectively read and employed. 
It can become a tool that interrogates, explores and builds upon pre-existing – but nonetheless 
vital – conceptual developments. Such an engagement with Barad positions Meeting the Universe 
Halfway as part of the on-going apparatus that seeks to produce research that is attentive, plural, 
partial and politically ambitious. In his reading of Foucault, Agamben (2009: 13) states that ‘there 
comes a moment when we are aware of our inability to proceed any further without 
contravening the most elementary of hermeneutics. This means the development of the text in 
question has reached a point of undecidability where it becomes impossible to distinguish 
between the author and the interpreter. Although this is a particularly happy moment for the 
interpreter, he [sic] knows that it is now time to abandon the text that he is analysing and to 
proceed on his own.’ Let Meeting the University Halfway, likewise, not become a tome to cling to 
but a tool to synthesis. 
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